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A. Disregard of Corporate Form
In the case of DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flem-
ming Fruit Co.,' the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that South Caro-
lina law will allow the corporate form to be disregarded in certain
circumstances.2 Although the doctrine of "piercing the corporate
veil" has long been recognized in South Carolina, 3 the court in
DeWitt has thoroughly analyzed the current law on the issue and
has taken a liberal view of the South Carolina position.
W. Ray Flemming owned approximately ninety percent of
the stock of Flemming Fruit Company.4 Flemming Fruit acted as
a selling agent for fruit growers. The corporation sold the produce
in wholesale markets and used the services of the plaintiff-
appellee, DeWitt, to transport the produce to the purchaser. The
grower received the full purchase price, less Flemming's sales
commission and the transportation costs, which were represented
as having been remitted to the plaintiff. However, during the
period involved in this case, DeWitt was not paid. Flemming
Fruit Company was in fact insolvent. As a result, DeWitt brought
an action to pierce the corporate veil and hold Flemming, the
president of the corporation, personally liable for the debt. The
district court pierced the corporate veil and found Flemming lia-
ble; 5 Flemming appealed.
Since the facts involved in any given case on piercing the
corporate veil will likely be unique,' the findings of the trial court
will be considered "presumptively correct and [will] be left un-
disturbed on appeal unless. . clearly erroneous."7 After consid-
1. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
2. While a corporation is usually considered as an entity distinct from its sharehold-
ers, a court can disregard the corporate form and hold the individual shareholders liable
for acts "knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation." 1 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
3. Long v. McGlon, 263 F. Supp. 96 (D.S.C. 1967); Parker Peanut Co. v. Felder, 200
S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716 (1942); Nettles v. Sottile, 184 S.C. 1, 191 S.E. 796 (1937).
4. This was according to Flemming's own testimony, although it was not verified by
any stock records.
5. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., No. 74-1166 (D.S.C.,
filed April 4, 1975).
6. Auer v. Frank, 227 Cal. App. 2d 396, 38 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1964).
7. 540 F.2d at 684 (quoting G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 939
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ering the facts involved in DeWitt, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the finding of the district court was not clearly erroneous and
affirmed.' The court relied on two apparently distinct considera-
tions to reach this conclusion.
First, the court used the "alter ego" or "instrumentality"
theory for piercing the corporate veil. The court began by recog-
nizing that while a corporation is usually treated as an entity
distinct from its stockholders,9 this results from a legal fiction
that will be disregarded when necessary to prevent injustice.' 0
The result is that the debts of the corporation are treated as the
individual debts of its stockholders. Because this can clearly have
far-reaching effects, the power to pierce the corporate veil should
only be used "reluctantly" and "cautiously."" The defendant
had contended that the corporate form should be disregarded
only when there is "proof of plain fraud."" However, the court
stressed that while fraud is the most common basis for disregard-
ing corporateness, the general rule is that fraud is not a necessary
element, 3 and South Carolina law is in accord with this general
rule. But it is "equally as well settled . . . that the mere fact
that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by one
individual or a few individuals, will not afford sufficient grounds
for disregarding corporateness."" It is a well-recognized and legit-
imate objective to incorporate in order to avoid individual liabil-
ity. Nonetheless, when such ownership is found along with certain
other factors, the courts will pierce the corporate veil and impose
individual liability. 6 These factors, as enumerated by the court,
are undercapitalization for the purposes of the corporate under-
taking, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of
dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation, siphoning of
funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, nonfunc-
8. 540 F.2d at 687.
9. See Fishman v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 513, 197 S.E.2d 467, 473 (1973).
10. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905);
Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942).
11. 540 F.2d at 683.
12. Id. at 684.
13. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362, reh. denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944); National
Marine Serv., Inc. v. C.J. Thibodeaux & Co., 501 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. Long v. Carolina Baking Co., Inc., 190 S.C. 367, 377, 3 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1939);
Jennings v. Automobile Sales Co., 107 S.C. 514, 516, 93 S.E. 188, 189 (1917).
15. 540 F.2d at 685.
16. Id. (citing with approval Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough Co. v. West
Fork Towing Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (N.D.W. Va. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1971)).
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tioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records,
and the use of the corporation as a mere facade for the operations
of the dominant stockholder or stockholders.'7 The decision to
pierce the corporate veil must rest on a combination of these
factors and the additional element of fundamental unfairness.'
8
The court found in DeWitt many of the above elements as
well as the required injustice. Flemming had disregarded many
of the normal corporate formalities. There were no adequate re-
cords showing who the other stockholders, officers or directors
were. Although Flemming testified that there was one other direc-
tor, Ed Bernstein, no real directors' meetings had ever been
held, 9 and, more importantly, Bernstein had received no com-
pensation from the corporation. There had been no stockholders'
meetings.20 But the factor that probably influenced the court
most heavily was "the purely personal matter in which the corpo-
ration was operated.""1 Flemming made all of the decisions and
was the only shareholder or officer to receive any compensation
at all from the corporation. His salary, which was never author-
ized by the board of directors, "varied with what could be taken
out of the corporation at the moment";22 it ranged from $15,000
to $25,000 each year when the corporation showed no profit and
had no working capital.
The court was greatly influenced by the fact that the corpo-
ration was undercapitalized:
If a corporation is organized and carries on business without
substantial capital in such a way that the corporation is likely
to have no sufficient assets available to meet its debts, it is
inequitable that shareholders should set up such a flimsy organ-
ization to escape personal liability. The attempt to do business
without providing any basis of financial responsibility to credi-
tors is an abuse of the separate entity and will be ineffective to
exempt the shareholders from corporate debts. It is coming to
be recognized as the policy of the law that shareholders should
in good faith put at the risk of the business unencumbered capi-
17. 540 F.2d at 681.
18. Id. at 687.
19. Flemming testified that he and Bernstein, a New York resident, kept in contact
by telephone.
20. In his original deposition, Flemming said there had been no shareholder meetings.
Later, claiming that he had misunderstood the question, he produced minutes of five
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tal reasonably adequate for its prospective liabilities. If the cap-
ital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done
and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the separate
entity privilege."3
The corporation initially had capitalization of five thousand
shares issued for one dollar each. Two thousand shares had since
been retired, and even the remaining three thousand dollars, "it
seems fair to conclude, had been seemingly exhausted by a long
succession of years when the corporation operated at no profit."2
No dividends were ever paid, and the only working capital avail-
able to the corporation came from its commissions and the trans-
portation charges which were not remitted to the plaintiff. The
court also found in the undercapitalization the required element
of injustice:
Were the opinion of the District Court herein to be reversed,
Flemming would be permitted to retain substantial sums from
the operations of the corporation without having any real capital
in the undertaking, risking nothing of his own and using as
operating capital what he had collected as due the plaintiff.
Certainly, equity and fundamental justice support individual
liability of Flemming for plaintiff's charges. . . .This case pat-
ently presents a blending of the very factors which courts have
regarded as justifying a disregard of the corporate entity in fur-
therance of basic and fundamental fairness.25
If the decision to pierce the corporate veil had rested on these
factors alone, there would be several serious shortcomings in the
logic of the court. The manner in which Flemming operated the
company is in reality very common in close corporations. All
statutory formalities, except those mentioned by the court, were
followed. For example, an annual report was filed with the South
Carolina Secretary of State. 6 The statutory requirement for ini-
tial capitalization, one thousand dollars, had been met." Moreo-
ver, there is authority for the proposition that undercapitalization
should not be considered when a contract rather than a tort is
23, H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORAIONs 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946).
24. 540 F.2d at 688.
25. Id. at 689.
26. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., No. 74-1166 (D.S.C.,
filed April 4, 1975).
27. S.C. COnE ANN. § 33-7-60 (1976).
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involved .2 A person entering a contract has a duty of inquiry as
to the financial basis of the corporation. Failure to make ade-
quate inquiry can estop the injured party in a contract case from
attempting to pierce the corporate veil, since he is assumed to
contract on the financial basis of the corporation, not on the
credit of the stockholders.29
However, there was an additional element in DeWitt which
negates the estoppel arguments. Flemming had personally guar-
anteed payment of the debt to DeWitt. The Statute of Frauds did
not bar enforcement of the oral promise.
[RIeliance on such statute is often regarded as without merit
in a case where the promise or assurance is given "at the time
or before the debt is created," for in that case the promise is
original and without the statute . . . . A number of courts,
including South Carolina, however, have gone further and have
held that, where the promisor owns substantially all of the stock
of the corporation and seeks by his promise to serve his pecuni-
ary advantage, the question whether such promise is "within the
statute of frauds" is a fact question to be resolved by the trial
court and this is true whether the promise was made before the
debt was incurred or during the time it was being incurred.2
The court treated the personal guarantee as an additional,
though extremely important,"1 element in the overall pattern re-
quired to disregard the corporate form. However, a personal guar-
antee, not barred by the Statute of Frauds, would seem to be
sufficient grounds to impose liability on Flemming without resort
to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Thus logically the
court established two alternative bases for affirming the decision
of the lower court: the "instrumentality" theory for piercing the
corporate veil and the personal guarantee of Flemming. Because
the instrumentality theory is weak without the added element of
the guarantee, the major precedential value of this case is based
on the personal guarantee of Flemming.
28. Comment, Disregard of the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIo STATE
L.J. 441 (1967).
29. Cranson v. I.B.M., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964).
30. 540 F.2d at 689 (citing Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1891); American
Wholesale Corp. v. Mauldin, 128 S.C. 241, 244-45, 122 S.E. 576 (1924)).
31. 540 F.2d at 687. The court indicated that such a guarantee was an individually
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B. Shareholder Derivative Actions
In Grant v. Gosnell,32 the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered what demands a shareholder must make before he.can
bring a derivative action. Generally, corporate management has
the right to sue for injuries to the corporation.3 Before a share-
holder can bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation,
he must allege in his complaint and establish either that he has
made a demand that the officers or directors bring the suit or that
such a demand would be futile. 4 Many states now have a deriva-
tive action statute that incorporates this common law rule.15
South Carolina does not have a derivative action statute but does
follow the common law.
36
In Grant, the plaintiff brought a derivative action on behalf
of First State National Bank against several defendants allegedly
involved in a series of fraudulent loans. The defendants included
five former directors of the bank, two bank executives, and one
bank customer. The complaint justified the failure to make a
demand for relief on the directors and shareholders in the follow-
ing way:
(2) Plaintiff has not made a demand on FSNB's directors and
shareholders in an effort to have them institute this action di-
rectly rather than derivatively on FSNB's behalf, such failure
to make such demands being excusable on the ground that
FSNB's board of directors is controlled by, and a majority of its
shares are held by, persons charged in this lawsuit with the
wrongdoing that is the basis for this Complaint, all of which
means that demands by the plaintiff on the board of directors
and shareholders would be fruitless and utterly without produc-
tive consequences."
Two of the defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the
court because the plaintiffs allegation that a request for relief
32. 266 S.C. 372, 223 S.E.2d 413 (1976).
33. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5963 (rev.
perm. ed. 1970).
34. Id. (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450 (1882)).
35. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1491 (1973); N.Y. Bus.
Conp. LAW § 626 (McKinney) (1963).
36. Thompson v. Thompson, 214 S.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 169 (1948); Equitable Trust Co.
of Columbia v. Columbia Nat'l Bank, 145 S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811 (1928); Latimer v. Rich-
mond & D.R.R., 39 S.C. 44, 17 S.E. 258 (1893).
37. Record at 2.
[Vol. 29
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would be unavailing was "not founded upon fact or reason."" The
lower court found that such a request "would have been an exer-
cise in futility, and, therefore, such demand was unnecessary. 3 9
The defendants appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed. 0
The factual situation involved in the case presented the court
with two clear alternatives. The majority of the board of directors
was never accused of wrongdoing. When the suit was filed, all but
one of the directors who were defendants in the suit had resigned.
Therefore, the court could have found that since a majority of the
board was disinterested, a demand for relief should have been
made. The lower court had chosen instead to look at the realities
of the situation. Three of the defendants had maintained close
ties with the bank. One, who had organized the bank, remained
as chairman of the board, chief executive officer, and majority
shareholder. A second defendant was attorney for the bank and
resumed his position as director after the suit was filed. A third
defendant, who was a past president and director, served as con-
sultant to the bank. The lower court found, in effect, that these
three controlled the board even though they did not represent a
majority of it.4"
The defendants had relied strongly on the Pennsylvania case
of Law v. Fuller12 to support their position that control of a major-
ity of the stock by a defendant was not sufficient reason to excuse
the required demand for intra-corporate relief. 3 Moreover, the
defendants argued that the court should not have assumed that
the remaining directors would not have exercised independent
judgment; "the Court should have presumed that the directors
would have performed their duty rather than that they would
not."44
The lower court was unconvinced:
However, this Court is not persuaded by the logic of the Court
in Law. Law ignores the reality that most director meetings of
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 22.
40. 266 S.C. at 377, 223 S.E.2d at 415.
41. Record at 22.
42. 217 Pa. 439, 66 A. 754 (1907).
43. Brief for Appellant at 7-8.
44. Id. at 9. South Carolina law imposes a duty on directors to act "in good faith with
a view to the interests of the corporation and of the shareholders and with that degree of
diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar cir-
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relatively small corporations are controlled by directors who are
also involved in the day-to-day activities of the Bank. Pharma-
cists, farmers and unkindred businessmen possess only lay
knowledge of Bank operations. While recent reversals in the
banking business point to a need for active diligence on the part
of lay directors, this Court will not shut its eyes to reality."
The supreme court found further support for the lower court
decision in Stahn v. Catawba Mills,"6 where the court had excused
the shareholder's failure to demand that corporate management
bring the suit. The defendants argued against the applicability
of Stahn, because that case involved a board where a majority of
the members were defendants. The court, however, did not inter-
pret Stahn to require that a majority of the board be alleged
wrongdoers. The two elements that were emphasized in Stahn,
the control of a majority of the stock by an alleged wrongdoer and
the breach of trust involved, were both found in Grant and these
factors were deemed controlling. Thus the supreme court af-
firmed the decision of the lower court and refused to dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction.
IX. LABOR LAW
In Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Services, Inc.,4 the
Fourth Circuit was confronted with two commonly recurring
problems in the field of labor law. The first issue concerned the
"arbitral bar," or the restriction on judicial action in a dispute
covered by a collective bargaining agreement after an arbitrator
has reached a final decision under the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. The second, and related, issue involved
the union's duty of fair representation owed to all employees
within the bargaining unit.
The defendant Allstate hired truckdrivers and leased them
to various corporations. The drivers were paid by Allstate but
dispatched by the companies for which they worked. The plaintiff
Hardee was employed by Allstate and worked for Allied Chemical
Motor Operations. Allied had scheduled Hardee for a trip that
would have made it impossible for him to attend an important
union meeting." Hardee attempted to reschedule both the trip
45. Record at 21-22.
46. 53 S.C. 519, 31 S.E. 498 (1898).
47. 537 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976).
48. Hardee, a long-time union- member, wanted to attend the meeting because
[Vol. 29
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and the meeting. When these attempts failed, he made arrange-
ments to make part of the trip and to fly home in time for the
meeting; his fellow driver agreed to drive the rest of the way back
alone. He informed the Allied dispatchers of his plans. The con-
troversy arose because he later falsified his log by claiming to
have been in the sleeper cabin of the truck when in fact he had
flown home for the meeting. Moreover, he presented a claim for
the total mileage of the trip and was later paid in full for that
mileage as well as for delay time to which he was not entitled.
When Allstate's regional manager learned that Hardee had in
fact not made all of the return trip, an investigation was con-
ducted and Hardee was discharged for "falsification of his log and
theft of company time."49
Hardee requested his union0 to protest his discharge through
the grievance and arbitration process provided by the collective
bargaining agreement between Allstate and the union. After the
three stages of the grievance procedure failed to produce a satis-
factory result, the dispute was presented to an arbitrator. The
arbitrator upheld the discharge.5' The plaintiff then filed charges
with the National Labor Relations Board against the union for
failure to adequately represent him. Charges were also filed
against the defendant for wrongful discharge. All of these charges
were subsequently dismissed by the Board.
52
Having failed in his attempts to get redress through arbitra-
tion and the National Labor Relations Board, Hardee brought an
action in federal court seeking damages from Allstate for wrongful
discharge and defamation.5 3 The jury awarded Hardee $20,000 in
compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages, 4 and
Allstate appealed.
The federal courts have jurisdiction over breach of labor con-
tract suits under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.15 However, there is a strong federal policy favoring the pri-
vate resolution of such disputes by a method agreed upon by the
charges he had made against the union were going to be considered.
49. 537 F.2d at 1258.
50. Local 509 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America.
51. Appendix of Appellant at 165.
52. Id. at 64.
53. Hardee sought damages from Allstate for defamation based on the notices of
investigation and termination.
54. 537 F.2d at 1257.
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parties, commonly grievance and arbitration.56 In the now famous
Steelworkers Trilogy,57 Justice Douglas emphatically announced
a very limited role for the courts in reviewing a decision by an
arbitrator:
This plenary review by a court of the merits would make mean-
ingless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for
in reality it would almost never be final. . . . [T]he question
of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a
question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction
which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision
concerns the construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the con-
tract is different from his."
Thus a decision of an arbitrator which is unfavorable to a party
to a labor contract usually bars that party from bringing an action
under section 301.
However, the arbitral bar did not automatically require that
the jury verdict in Hardee be overturned. The courts have devel-
oped several exceptions59 to the arbitral bar. The decision can be
set aside, for example, where the arbitrator did not base his con-
clusions only on an interpretation and application of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement;6" where the arbitrator did not have
authority under the contract to decide the dispute;6' where the
award violated law62 or public policy; 3 where the award was in-
complete or ambiguous;64 or where there was a procedural defect
that denied a party fundamental fairness.65 Hardee based his at-
tempt to overcome the arbitral bar on a breach of the union's duty
of fair representation in its handling of the grievance and arbitra-
56. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement .... " 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1970).
57. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
58. 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
59. See generally R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW at 584-603 (1976).
60. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
61. Electrical Workers Local 278 v. Jetero Corp., 496 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. UAW Local 985 v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
63. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 292 (1956).
64. IAM v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 300 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1962).
65. UNITED STATES ARBrrRATION AcT, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
[Vol. 29
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tion process." This argument was based on the 1976 Supreme
Court decision in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight"7 wherein the
Court expressly held that:
The union's breach of duty relieves the employee of an express
or implied requirement that disputes be settled through con-
tractual grievance procedures; if it seriously undermines the
integrity of the arbitral process the union's breach also removes
the bar of the finality provisions of the contract."
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Hines was that the em-
ployer could be liable for damages, even after the arbitrator's
decision,69 regardless of whether the employer had conspired with
the union in breach of its duty. In other words, the employer
could not rely on the finality of the arbitrator's decision. The case
involved employees who were discharged for dishonesty. An arbi-
trator upheld the dismissal. Subsequently, the employee sued
both his employer and the union in federal court. The district
court. granted the union's motion for summary judgment. The
Sixth Circuit, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether the defendant union had breached its duty of fair
representation, ° reversed the judgment as to the union but af-
firmed the judgment for the employer, since there was "[n]o
evidence of misconduct on the part of the employer."7 The Su-
preme Court disagreed, pointing out that the employer had origi-
nated the charges that had turned out to be false:
Under the rule announced by the Court of Appeals, unless
the employer is implicated in the Union's malfeasance or has
66. The duty to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit was first recog-
nized in the railroad industry, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (constru-
ing Railway Labor Act) and later was expanded to include other industries. Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739
(5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). The Fourth Circuit described this duty
imposed on the union in Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972):
A union must conform its behavior to each of ... three separate standards.
First, it must treat all factions and segments of its membership without hostility
or discrimination. Next, the broad discretion of the union in asserting the rights
of its individual members must be exercised in complete good faith and honesty.
Finally, the union must avoid arbitrary conduct. Id. at 183.
67. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
68. Id. at 567.
69. Justice Stewart took issue with this in his concurring opinion. Id. at 572.
70. 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974). The charges of dishonesty were later shown to be
false. The employees argued that with a minimum of effort the union could have discov-
ered that they were false and that the failure to do so was a result of the union's bad faith.
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otherwise caused the arbitral process to err, petitioners would
have no remedy against Anchor even though they are successful
in proving the Union's bad faith, the falsity of the charges
against them, and the breach of contract by Anchor by discharg-
ing without cause. This rule would apparently govern even in
circumstances where it is shown that a union has manufactured
the evidence and knows from the start that it is false; or even
if, unbeknownst to the employer, the union has corrupted the
arbitrator to the detriment of disfavored union members. As is
the case where there has been a failure to exhaust, however, we
cannot believe that Congress intended to foreclose the employee
from his § 301 remedy otherwise available against the employer
if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed by the
union's breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and
in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary
conduct.7"
Thus the court in Hardee had clear precedent for removing
the arbitral bar if it found that the union had breached its duty
of fair representation. Hardee's testimony that there was hostility
between himself and the union leadership was largely uncon-
tested. He had twice been elected president of the local union,
and both times the International Union had imposed a trustee-
ship on the local.73 Hardee had filed charges against certain union
officials which were discussed at the meeting giving rise to the
falsification of the log. 4 However, as the court pointed out, "the
mere existence of bad feeling is not enough to obviate the final-
ity of an arbitration award; Hardee must show that his grievance
was handled improperly."75 The conduct of the union must be
"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."76
The attempt to establish the required breach of duty seemed
to be based on three factors.77 The first was that the union failed
to call as a witness, Ray, Hardee's fellow driver on the trip in
question. Hardee wanted Ray to establish that he had done his
full share of work on the trip and believed that he was entitled
72. 424 U.S. at 570.
73. Appendix of Appellant at 31-33.
74. The charges were against certain union officials for "abuse of members by written
or oral communications and denying union members the right to address themselves to
Union business in meetings." Brief for Appellant at 9.
75. 537 F.2d 1255, 1258 (4th Cir. 1976).
76. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
77. Brief for Appellant at 23.
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to full pay, and that thus he was not guilty of "theft of company
time," since "theft requires intent. ' 78 The penalty provided in the
contract for falsification of the log alone was a reprimand. How-
ever, Ray had in fact driven 400 more miles than had Hardee.79
Moreover, the testimony of Ray would have been damaging in
another way. Hardee wanted to establish that Ray was entitled
to receive almost all of the money that Hardee had received, and
that as a result the theft was really from Ray and not from Al-
lstate. But this still left twelve dollars unaccounted for, and
"under the collective bargaining agreement, the magnitude of
theft is irrelevant; '[theft or dishonesty of any kind' carries a
penalty of dismissal."80
The second factor relied on by Hardee to establish a breach
of the duty of fair representation was that he was not allowed to
help select the arbitrator. He testified that he had been told he
would be allowed to assist in the selection. However, as the
defendant pointed out, the list of arbitrators was submitted by
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,82 and all of the
names submitted should have met relatively high standards of
competence.
The final factor relied on by Hardee was the union's failure
to cross-examine some of the witnesses. Hardee particularly
stressed that the dispatchers, who allegedly knew about his plans
to leave the truck and fly home, should have been questioned
closely. The court stressed, however, that there was nothing these
witnesses could have said that would change the fact that Hardee
had falsified the log and that twelve dollars more had been paid
than was actually owed. Moreover, the union is allowed to use
wide discretion in deciding how to handle a grievance."
The court was heavily influenced by evidence which tended
to show that Hardee's grievance "was fully and vigorously prose-
cuted by the union."84 Despite the fact that an employee had no
absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration,85 the
union had processed Hardee's grievance through three stages of
78. Brief for Appellee at 13.
79. Brief for Appellant at 17.
80. 537 F.2d at 1259 n.2.
81. Appendix for Appellant at 40.
82. Brief for Appellant at 25.
83. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
84. 537 F.2d at 1259.
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grievance procedure as well as arbitration. Hardee was appar-
ently satisfied at the conclusion of the hearing with the way the
union had handled his case, because he had the opportunity to
add to the testimony presented at the hearing but declined to do
so." In addition, after the hearing, he told the arbitrator that he
had been fairly represented and told the union representative
that he had made a fine presentation. 7
Finding that there was "insufficient evidence to support an
inference by the jury that the arbitration proceeding was tainted
by union misconduct or neglect,"88 the court was bound by the
arbitrator's decision that the discharge was not improper. Since
there was also no evidence to support a jury verdict that the
plaintiff could recover for defamation, the court reversed the
judgment of the district court.89
Im. BANKING LAW
In Jolly v. Marion National Bank,"0 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court interpreted a section of the National Bank Act with-
out the aid of precedent. A shareholder of a national bank is
granted the right to inspect a list of shareholders of that bank in
section 62 of the National Bank Act:
The president and cashier of every national banking association
shall cause to be kept at all times a full and correct list of the
names and residences of all of the shareholders in the associa-
tion, and the number of shares held by each, in the office where
its business is transacted. Such list shall be subject to the
inspection of all the shareholders and creditors of the associa-
tion, and the officers authorized to assess taxes under State
authority, during business hours of each day in which business
may be legally transacted. A copy of such list, verified by the
oath of such president or cashier, shall be transmitted to the
Comptroller of the Currency within ten days of any demand
therefor made by him.'
The issue involved in Jolly is whether a shareholder has an abso-
86. Appendix for Appellant at 59. However, such comments have been considered as
not binding. Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 196 n.5 (D. Conn. 1974).
87. Appendix for Appellant at 78.
88. 537 F.2d at 1259.
89. Id. at 1260.
90. - S.C. -, 231 S.E.2d 206 (1976).
91. 12 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
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lute right of inspection, or is limited to inspection for a "proper
purpose" under section 62.
In general, a state court is bound by federal decisions when
construing a federal statute.12 However, there were no federal
court decisions interpreting the issue raised under this section of
the National Bank Act.13 Nor were there any applicable South
Carolina decisions. The courts of other states have considered the
issue, but such decisions are not binding on the courts of South
Carolina, although they are persuasive authority. 4
The case arose when the plaintiff, a shareholder of the defen-
dant bank, attempted to inspect the list of bank shareholders.
The bank refused his request, evidently because the shareholder
was chairman of the board of directors of a newly chartered bank
in Marion which was in direct competition with the defendant. 5
The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus99 in the circuit court to
order the defendant to allow such inspection. The lower court
held that the plaintiff had an absolute right under the National
Bank Act to inspect the shareholder list and that he was entitled
to a writ of mandamus as a matter of right. 7 The defendant
appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The supreme court reversed the decision of the lower court
and remanded it for further consideration. The court found that
the proper interpretation of the statute was not a settled issue and
there was no language in the statute indicating that the share-
holders' motive is irrelevant. As a result,
[t]he present statute simply states the common law rule and,
without express language to the contrary, there is no sound rea-
92. E.g., Keenan v. Luther, 138 S.C. 539, 137 S.E. 144 (1927).
93. This can be explained by the following excerpt:
A state court has jurisdiction to enforce such legal right as the stockholders of a
national bank may hdve to inspect the books of the bank, the appropriate
remedy being mandamus. This is by virtue of the provision of the National
Banking Act that for the purposes of all actions against national banks at law
or in equity, they shall be deemed citizens of the state in which they are located,
and that in such cases the Federal Circuit and District Courts shall have juris-
diction only as in cases between individual citizens of the same state.
10 Am. JUR. 2d Banks § 68 (1963).
94. E.g., Shepherd v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 233 S.C. 536, 106 S.E.2d 381 (1958).
95. Record at 11.
96. This writ is generally conceded to be the appropriate remedy in such a case,
although it is not the exclusive remedy. 5 W. FLrrCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2250 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
97. Record at 135.
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son to support the conclusion that Congress intended to enlarge
upon the common law requirement that a shareholder is limited
to a legitimate purpose in seeking to inspect the list of share-
holders."
Moreover, the court found that the writ of mandamus, according
to the "overwhelming weight of authority," ' is not a writ of right
but is granted in the discretion of the court. Drawing from the
analogous authority of decisions of state courts dealing with state
statutes on the right of shareholders to inspect corporate books
and records, the court found that even where a statute grants an
absolute right of inspection, the majority view allows an improper
motive to be used as a basis for denying a writ of mandamus.""l
Since "there is nothing in the statute or the right conferred to
justify the conclusion that the discretionary power of the State
Courts in granting the writ of mandamus was abridged,"'02 the
court remanded to consider the application for the writ as a mat-
ter of the court's discretion.1
3
To fully understand the import of this decision, one must
review the common law and statutory history of a shareholder's
right to inspect.' 4 At common law a shareholder had a right, upon
showing of proper purpose, to inspect corporate books and re-
cords, including shareholder lists, at a reasonable time and
place.' 5 While a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy
for enforcement in most cases, the writ was not considered to be
a matter of right. The shareholder had to demonstrate a "specific
interest at stake rendering the inspection necessary, or some ben-
eficial purpose for which the examination [was] desired."'06
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, many states
passed statutes which gave the shareholder in absolute terms the
right to inspect corporate books and records. This was probably
a result of the misuse of the common law provisions by majority
99. Id. at -, 231 S.E.2d at 208.
100. Id. (quoting Linton v. Gaillard, 203 S.C. 19, 25 S.E.2d 896 (1943)).
101. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 223 (1948).
102. - S.C. at -, 231 S.E.2d at 208.
103. Id.
104. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 2213 (rev. perm. ed. 1976); 18 Am. JUR. 2d Corporations § 178 (1965).
105. Tucson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Schantz, 5 Ariz. App. 511, 428 P.2d 686 (1967);
Leisner v. Kent Investors, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 132, 307 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1970).
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shareholders to limit the rights of minority shareholders.,"7 The
state courts have taken two different views as to the effect of these
statutes. One interpretation is that the right of a shareholder to
inspect corporate books and records is absolute; his motive or
purpose is immaterial; and the court has no discretion on an
application for a writ of mandamus to enforce this right, but must
issue the writ as a matter of right.0 8 The other, probably the
majority,'"9 is that although the right itself is absolute, the court
on application for a writ of mandamus to enforce that right
should exercise its discretion and deny the writ if the shareholder
is seeking inspection for an improper purpose."'
South Carolina was among the states to enact a statute giv-
ing the shareholder a seemingly unqualified right to inspect cor-
porate books and records."' There seems to be only one case
construing this statute, and its exact interpretation is unclear. In
Self v. Langley Mills,I" the shareholder sought to force the corpo-
ration, which had been organized under South Carolina law, to
bring its records, which were kept in another state, into South
Carolina so that the shareholder could inspect them. The court
stated that "[w]here a statute gives to stockholders the right to
examine corporate books, mandamus seems to be granted as a
matter of right." 1 3 However, on a petition for rehearing, the court
indicated that "the exercise of the right and its enforcement by
the courts are of necessity subject to the rule of reason."' ' Since
the discussion involved only the decision to force the corporation
to bring its records into the state, the "rule of reason" could apply
either only to the time and place for the inspection, or to the right
of inspection itself.
The current trend has been to redraft statutes dealing with
107. Note, "Proper Purpose" for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 393, 393-95.
108. Johnson v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 P. 1050 (1902); Venner v. Chicago City Ry.,
246 Ill. 170, 92 N.E. 643 (1910); In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
109. 18 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 186 (1965).
110. Hutson v. Brown, 248 Ala. 215, 26 So. 2d 907 (1946); Knox v. Coburn, 117 Me.
409, 104 A. 789 (1918); Wight v. Heublein, 111 Md. 649, 75 A. 507 (1910); Bernet v.
Multonman Lumber and Box Co., 119 Ore. 44, 247 P. 155 (1926).
111. Civil Code of S.C. § 2855 (1912): "Books Opened to Inspection. The books of any
corporation organized under this article shall be kept open to the inspection of any stock-
holder at all times."
112. 123 S.C. 179, 115 S.E. 754 (1922), modified, 123 S.C. 197, 115 S.E. 759 (1923).
113. Id. at 188, 115 S.E. at 757.
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the shareholder's right to inspect so as to make proper purpose a
statutory requirement." 5 South Carolina has followed this
trend."' In addition, a majority of courts today shift the burden
of proof, so that instead of the plaintiff being forced to prove
proper purpose, the defendant must show an improper purpose."7
These changes have in large part eliminated the controversy that
was inherent in the absolute language of earlier statutes. How-
ever, not all states have enacted statutes specifically requiring a
proper purpose. Thus the controversy still exists in those states,
and the controversy would seem to be applicable to any inspec-
tion statutes that are absolute in terms, such as section 62 of the
National Bank Act.
The language of the banking act grants a shareholder the
right to inspect the shareholder list in unqualified terms, similar
to those used in state statutes granting an absolute right to in-
spect all corporate books and records. This does not necessarily
imply that the logic used in interpreting those statutes applies to
the interpretation of the banking act. The right granted by sec-
tion 62 is applicable only to shareholder lists. Since no mention
is made of other corporate records, it is generally held that the
common law rule still applies to all records other than share-
holder lists."' There is, unfortunately, no clear indication of the
intent of Congress."' However, courts and commentators have
uniformily stated that motive is irrelevant to the right of a share-
holder to inspect the shareholder list of a national bank. 2' Those
115. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2215.1 (rev.
perm. ed. 1976).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-260 (1976).
117. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2253.1 (rev.
perm. ed. 1976).
118. Wittnebel v. Loughman, 80 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.), aff'g 9 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y.
1935) and 11 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 716 (1936); McNair v.
Bunt, 68 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1934).
119. The defendant argued that the obvious purpose behind § 62 (then § 5210) was
to protect shareholders, since at that time they were held personally liable for contracts
and debts of the bank as well as for the extent of their stock holdings. Since double
liability has been abolished, there is no longer any reason for allowing an absolute right
of inspection. Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 507 (citing Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S.
148, 156 (1905)). The plaintiff, however, pointed out that if indeed the statute has
"outlived its usefulness, it is a matter for action by the Congress, not the courts." Brief
for Petitioner-Respondent at 6.
120. Most v. First Nat'l Bank of San Diego, 246 Cal. App. 2d 425, 54 Cal. Rptr. 669
(1966); Murray v. Walker, 156 Ky. 536, 161 S.W. 512 (1913); Hurley v. National Bank of
Middletown, 252 App. Div. 272, 299 N.Y.S. 241 (1937); In re Murray, 195 Misc. 629, 88
N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
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courts that have considered the question also hold that a writ of
mandamus should issue as a matter of right, with no discretion
left to the court.1 2' This is the position taken by the lower court'
22
in Jolly as well as by the dissenting opinion in the supreme court
decision.' 23 This view has been described as follows:
Thus stockholders of a national bank have a right to inspect the
list of stockholders and the number of shares held by them as
recorded on the books of the bank, and the motive for wishing
to inspect the list is wholly immaterial. The only requisites to
the right of examination are that the applicant be a bona fide
stockholder and that the application be made during business
hours.' 4
The supreme court chose not to follow this interpretation of
section 62 of the National Bank Act. However, the position taken
by the court is not altogether clear. One interpretation of the
opinion in Jolly is that the banking act merely codified the com-
mon law and that neither the shareholder right to inspect nor the
right to the remedy of a writ of mandamus is absolute. This
interpretation is indicated by the court's assertion that the
"present statute simply states the common law rule."'' 25 The ap-
pellant made a persuasive argument in support of this view:
Indeed because the belief was prevalent at the time national
banks were chartered under Federal law that there was no com-
mon law of the United States in the sense of a national or cus-
tomary law, Title 12, U.S.C. Section 62, may represent only the
congressional conviction that it was necessary to codify the com-
mon law right of inspection in order to make that right available
to national bank shareholders.'26
Further, there is case authority for the view that statutes granting
There is dictum indicating the possibility of a contrary result. "Doubtless the court
has power to withhold an inspection for an illegitimate purpose, and may regulate the time
when the inspection shall be made." People ex rel. Lorge v. Consolidated Nat'l Bank, 105
App. Div. 409, 412, 94 N.Y.S. 173, 175 (1905). See also Most v. First Nat'l Bank of San
Diego, 246 Cal. App. 2d 425, 54 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1966).
121. Most v. First Nat'l Bank of San Diego, 246 Cal. App. 2d 425, 54 Cal. Rptr. 669
(1966); Hurley v. National Bank of Middletown, 252 App. Div. 272, 299 N.Y.S. 241 (1937).
122. Record at 135.
123. - S.C. - , - , 231 S.E.2d 206, 208 (1976) (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at __, 231 S.E.2d at 209 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 AM. JUR.
2d Banks § 68 (1963)).
125. - S.C. at -, 231 S.E.2d at 208.
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a seemingly unqualified right of inspection in fact only codified
the common law provision for inspection.' This may, of course,
accurately represent the congressional intent in passing 12 U.S.C.
§ 62. The problem with this interpretation is that the statute
deals only with shareholder lists. Therefore, it is only logical to
assume that Congress had some purpose in mind other than to
codify the common law, and the above interpretation of the stat-
ute makes no allowance for this purpose. Also, it has generally
been held that statutes granting a right of inspection, in whatever
terms, enlarge and extend the common law right.' 8
The other possible interpretation of Jolly is that the South
Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the position taken by a
majority of state courts in interpreting state statutes granting an
absolute right of inspection of corporate books and records, i.e.,
that the right is absolute but the writ of mandamus is discretion-
ary. This interpretation finds support in the following logic and
holding of the court: "There is nothing in the statute or the right
conferred to justify the conclusion that the discretionary power of
the state courts in granting the writ of mandamus was
abridged."'2 9
If the latter interpretation is the correct one of the position
taken by the court, it brings the decision more in line with pre-
vailing theory on inspection statutes. However, it still neglects
the distinct possibility that Congress had a specific purpose in
limiting the scope of section 62 to shareholder lists.
The court was undoubtedly influenced by the equities of the
situation presented. The plaintiff, as a major stockholder and
officer in a competing local bank, had at least doubtful motives
for wanting to inspect the shareholder list. While the plaintiff
originally held 300 shares of stock of the defendant bank, he sold
and transferred all but one share after the lower court decision."'
127. Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 P. 1024 (1930); Sawers v. American Phenolic
Corp., 404 11. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1949).
128. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2215.1 (rev.
perm. ed. 1976); Self v. Langley Mills, 123 S.C. 179, 188, 115 S.E. 754, 757 (1922),
modified, 123 S.C. 197, 115 S.E. 759 (1923).
129. - S.C. at -, 231 S.E.2d at 208. There is also an indication that the court
may have shifted the burden to the defendant to show improper purpose on the share-
holder's part, which, in effect, would qualify the absolute terms of the statute. The indica-
tion of this comes from a quotation cited with approval to the effect that "an improper
motive or purpose on the part of the petitioning stockholder is a defense which will induce
the court to deny the writ." Id. (quoting 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 223 (1948) (emphasis
added)).
130. Amendment to Transcript of Record at 1.
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Since the issue was one of first impression in South Carolina, and
since there was no binding precedent, the court was free to inter-
pret the statute in whatever way it deemed appropriate. There
were many factors influencing the court to find that the plaintiff's
motive was not irrelevant: the equities of the situation, the de-
mise of the double liability standard, and the current trend to-
wards making a proper purpose a requirement for inspection of
corporate records. Thus the court disagreed with the prevailing
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